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AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: AN FEPC MISFIT
OLDER workers frequently suffer employer disfavor. Because the seniority
system 1 and the practice of placing old employees in less demanding jobs 2
tend to protect the worker once he is employed, age discrimination occurs
primarily in hiring rather than in firing.3 Employment notices often contain
specific age restrictions; alternatively, age limits are maintained by unwritten
rules.4 Such discrimination wastes a valuable labor resource, increases the
public's social security burdens, and undermines the psychological as well as
the economic well-being of the worker himself.5 These problems are magnified
by the growing proportion of older people in the population.0
Opponents of age discrimination have in the past waged their battle chiefly
1. Over three fourths of 330 collective bargaining agreements analyzed recently by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics made seniority a factor in determining the order of layoff.
In about 60 per cent of the agreements seniority alone governed the order of layoff, pro-
vided that the older worker was competent to do available work. Nix, Collectively Bar-
gained Length of Service Benefits, 73 U.S. DEP'T. LABOR MONTHLY LAB, REV. 152, (1951)
(hereinafter cited as MONTHLY LAB. REV.).
2. This is often done voluntarily by the employer. See Clague, Older Workers:
Industrial Aspects of Aging, 70 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 506 (1950). Moreover some col-
lective bargaining agreements contain clauses requiring employers to place older employees
in light jobs. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, FAcT BOOK ON TlE EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS
OF OLDER WoRxERs 17-20 (1950). See also Wages and Hours of Labor, 44 MONTnLY
LAB. REV. 688, 702 (1937).
3. See BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, OLDER WORKERS SEK JOBs--SURVEY IN
FouR PULIC EMPLOYMENT SERVIcE Orriczs 2 (1951), where the conclusion is reached
that although "the older worker remains out of a job for a longer period of time than
his younger shopmates... [h~is job tenure... is no less secure." See also BARKIN', ThE
OLDER WORKER IN INDUSTRY-A STUDY OF NEW YORK STATE MANUFACTURING INDUS-
TRIxS 179 (1933); BEVERIDGE, Fuu EMPLOYMENT IN A FREE SoCIETY 70 (1944).
4. See, e.g., BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 9. Age re-
strictions were found in 72 per cent of the job openings in Columbus, Ohio; 60 per cent
of the openings in Lancaster, Pennsylvania; 51 per cent in Houston, Texas; and 25 per
cent in New York City. However, a New York survey during the depression period
showed 72 per cent of manufacturing industries investigated had discriminatory age hir-
ing policies. BARKIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 190. See also CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENI' OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SPECIAL BULLETIN No. 2, 'MIDDLE-AGED AND OLDER WORKMRS IN
CALIFORNIA 19 (1930), where only 11 per cent of all firms investigated were found to
have maximum age limits for hiring.
5. See H.R. 4731, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1951; Carlson, The Older Worker,
57 SCe. MONTHLY 5 (1943); Hamilton, Changes in Personality and Psychosexual Pho-
nomena with Age in PROBLEMS OF AGEING 810, 817. (Cowdry ed., 2d ed. 1942).
6. Between 1900 and 1950 the number in the forty-five to sixty-five age group tri-
pled, and their proportion in the total population increased from one in seven to one in
five. In that same period the number of persons aged sixty-five or over almost quad-
rupled and their proportion in the population inoreased from one in twenty-five to one
in thirteen. These changes are generally attributed to the decline in the birth rate, the
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by persuasion and agreement. Welfare organizations attempt to encourage em-
ployers to place older workers.7 Federal and state governments aid these
activities,8 and older workers themselves have organized not only to find jobs
but also to create work opportunities. 9 A more recent method of fighting age
increase in longevity due to medical science and higher living standards, and the cesra-
tion of large-scale immigration. BLnz.Au oF LAnoR STATISTICS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1.
The Commissioner of Labor Statistics asserts that the problem of the older worker
is caused by the interaction of two factors: (1) rapid technological changes in industry
which render the skills of older workers obsolete, and (2) the growing number of older
workers in the labor force. Clague, Employment Problems of the Older Wor.er, 65
MoNTHLY LAR REv. 661 (1947).
7. See, e.g., Michael, Job Sleuths for the Middle-Aged, Coronet, Oct. 1949, p. 165;
After 40 What? Services of the Presidents' Guidance Bureau of San Francisco, 23
ScHooL LIFE 360 (1938) ; Waggaman, Older Workers in Wartime, 59 MO-NTHL, LAD.
REv. 24, 34 (1944).
8. The efforts of the federal government are mainly informational and exhortatory.
See, e.g., the proclamation by President Roosevelt designating National Employment
Week "to the end that interest in the welfare of all those not now working, and especial-
ly the worker over 40, may be stimulated and employment extended to them." Exec.
Order No. 8729, 6 FED. REG. 1791 (1941). Much of this work is carried on by the De-
partment of Labor in the Bureau of Employment Security and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. While more direct action is rare, in a notable exception efforts of the Veterans
Placement Service of the Bureau of Employment Security raised the permanent place-
ments of older workers in Toledo 11 per cent in one year. Toledo Plans for Placing
Veterans, 51 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 1120, 1121 (1940). On the other hand the government
itself maintains age limits for many of its own job qualifications. See, e.g., 3aximmn Age
for Civil-Serice Positions Under National Defense, 52 MONrHLY LAB. REv. 1395 (1941).
California and Pennsylvania have experimented with the practice of publishing the
names of employers who do not have policies of age discrimination. CAL1F0amA DEPArM-
MENT OF INDUSTEIAL RELATIONS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 83-93; Abolishing a Definite
Age Limit in. Employment, Monthly Labor Review, Dec. 1928, p. 93. New York has tried
rehabilitation programs for older workers. Unwmployzent of Older Workers in New
York, 49 MONTHLY LAB. Rv. 364 (1939). Bills are now pending before the New York
Legislature to establish an adult health and geriatrics program and an advisory council
on empoy-ment of older workers to combat age barriers. N.Y. Times, February 15, 1952,
p. 13, col. 1.
9. Best known are the "40 plus" clubs. These are groups of unemployed executives
who once earned at least $4,000 per year. Members interview prospective employers with
the purpose of getting jobs for their fellow members rather than for themselves. Wagga-
man, New Techniques for Getting Jobs, 50 MONTHLY LA . REv. 797, 804 (1940). See
also Giles, Hired After Forty-Boston Style, Reader's Digest, Dec. 1933, p. 1.; and
Recent Activities of New York Forty Plus Club, 51 MONTHLY LAD. Ruv. 623 (1941).
These clubs have provided the impetus for similar activities by other groups. See Business
Week, Aug. 13, 1938, pp. 30-1; and Los Angeles 40-plus Club for Women, 53 MoNTHLY
LA. REv. 393 (1940).
Workers' co-ops composed mainly of older workers, arose on the west coast during
the depression. These "self-help" co-ops engage chiefly in the barter of their labor for
goods. Members work mainly as farmers, common laborers, dressmakers and kitchen
helpers. PANUNZIO, CHURc H, & WVASSEP-MAN, SExF-Hrrm Coopr .ivrs n- Los Azw-as
(1939). See also Self-Help Cooperatives for Older Workers, 48 MfoN-rLY LAD. REV.
1081 (1939).
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discrimination is to include clauses in collectively bargained agreements re-
quiring employers either to abolish age limits in hiring or to hire a specified
proportion of older workers. 10
Two legislatures have recently moved to supplement these efforts. In Massa-
chusetts, the Fair Employment Practices Commission law was amended to
make age as well as race, color, religion, national origin and ancestry an illegal
ground for discrimination in hiring, firing, or conditions of employment.' 1
Discrimination is allowed only when based on a "bona fide occupational quali-
fication.' 12 A bill to prohibit age discrimination has also been introduced in
Congress."3 Both measures provide similar procedure for processing com-
plaints. Either the agency or an individual may file a charge of discrimina-
10. BUREAU OF LABOR STAtisTics, op. cit. sufpra note 2, at 17-18. Such clauses were,
however, found in only one per cent of 2,425 contracts examined by the Bureau,
11. Acts of 1950 c. 697, MAss. ANN. LAWS C. 151B (Supp. 1951). The amendment
originated in a bill filed by the Massachusetts Federation of Labor. Kelley, The Bay
State Pioneers, The American Federationist, Nov. 1950, p. 14. There is some question
as to how thoroughly it was considered by the legislature.
"For months the battle [over' the age amendment] raged at the State House." Ibid.
"There was singularly little discussion of [the age amendment] and no opposition."
Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Mildred H. Mahoney, Chairman of the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, dated October 10, 1951, on file in
Yale Law Library.
Massachusetts also has another law prohibiting age discrimination. MASs. ANN. LAWS
c. 149 §24A-J (1950). This law, passed in 1937, declares that discrimination against
people forty-five to sixty-five in hiring or firing is against public policy. Id. § 24A. It
voids the provisions of any contract which promotes such discrimination. Id. § 24B. Em-
ployers are required to keep records of the ages of their employees. Id. § 24D. The com-
missioner of Labor and Industries is authorized to hold hearings to determine the exist.
ence of age discrimination. Id. § 24G. Upon a finding of discrimination, the commissioner
may publish the name of the offending employer in newspapers. Ibid. But neither the
commissioner, 'his representatives, the "newspaper publisher, proprietors, editor, nor
employee" are immunized from a damage action for wilful misrepresentation. Ibid. The
law was applied in only two cases in thirteen years, Kelley, Massachusetts Law Against
Age Discriminatior in Employment, in N. Y. L.Gxs. Doc. No. 12, No Timt. TO GRow OLD
173 (1951).
Louisiana had previously passed a law making age discrimination against workers
under fifty a misdemeanor punishable -by a fine of up to $500 or by imprisonment up to
90 days or both. Louisiana Acts 1934, No. 226 §§ 1-3, LA. Ray. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 892.3
(1950). This law, as well as the earlier Massachusetts statute, was characterized by the
New York Commission studying the age problem as "[not] even partially effective."
Findings and Recomnendations of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on
Proble s of Aging in, N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 12, No TImE To Gaow OLv 29 (1951).
12. MAss. ANN. LAWS C. 151B, § 4 (1950). This provision was part of the law
prior to the age amendment.
13. Three identical bills were introduced July 9, 1951: H.R. 4731, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
by Representative Jacob Javits, R., N.Y.; H.R. 4733, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. by Repre-
sentative James Fulton, R., Pa.; and H.R. 4734, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. by Representative
Albert Morano, R., Conn. For simplicity, references in this note will be to H.R. 4731.
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tion.14 If the agency finds probable cause for the charge, it first attempts to
eliminate the discrimination by informal methods of conference and persuasion.
Should these fail a formal hearing is called.15 Upon a finding of unjustified
discrimination because of age, the agency can issue a cease and desist order
and take other affirmative action such as compelling reinstatement or hiring. 0
The legislation also provides for review and enforcement by the courts.1 T In
addition, Massachusetts sets up criminal penalties for wilful violation of a
final order issued by its Commission Against Discrimination.' 8
Neither measure is broad enough to deal with the whole problem of the
older worker. The Massachusetts law applies only to workers between forty-
five and sixty-five, and the federal bill is probably limited to workers over
forty-five.' 9 But there is ample evidence of age discrimination against workers
under forty-five, particularly in the case of women.20 Furthermore, many in-
14. MASS AxN. LAWS c. 151B § 5 (Supp. 1951); H.R. 4731, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 7(a) (1951). The Massachusetts agency is the Commission Against Discrimination;
the federal agency is the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. The
IMassachusetts law also provides for the filing of complaints by the state attorney general.
15. Mss. ANN. LAws c. 151B § 5 (Supp. 1951); H.R. 4731, V-d Cong., 1st Sess.
§7(a) (1951). Under the Massachusetts statute the hearing is held before the Com-
mission itself. The federal bill on the other hand requires that the hearing be held before
the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor or "his
duly authorized representative." H.R. 4731, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. §7(b) (1951). In either
case final determination of the existence of age discrimination must be made by the Ad-
ministrator himself. Id. §§ 7(d) and (i).
16. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 151B § 5 (Supp. 1951); H.R. 4731, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
§7(i) (1951).
17. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 151B § 6 (Supp. 1951); H.R. 4731, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 8 (1951) (misnumbered in the bill as § 9).
18. Penalties are imprisonment for not more than one year, or a fine of not more than
$500 or both. The same sanctions apply for the wilful filing of a false complaint. AfAss.
ANN. La.ws c. 151B § 8(Supp. 1951). Both the Massachusetts law and the federal bill
apply these penalties to anyone resisting or interfering with an authorized representative
of the agency engaged in the performance of his duties. Ibid.; H.R. 4731, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 14 (1951).
19. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 151B § 1(8) (Supp. 1951). The prohibitory sections of the
federal bill mention no limits, but the declaration of policy is against "...bias generally
against workers over forty-five...." H.R. 4731, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. §2(b). Section
6(c) (7) provides that the purpose of the advisory and conciliation councils which the bill
authorizes is to foster means "to fully utilize the skills of workers over forty-five.....
In a letter to Director of Defense Mobilization Charles E. Wilson, Representative Javits
speaks of his "introducing H. R. 4731 to prohibit discrimination in employment of workers
over forty-five... ." Press release of Representative Javits dated Aug. 26, 1951, on file in
Yale.Law Library.
20. In a recent New York City survey two thirds of the job openings which had
age limitations called for workers under thirty-five years of age. Two fifths of the open-
ings required workers under twenty-five. BuIR.wU OF EMPLOYMENT SECUMIT. Op. Cit.
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dividuals over sixty-five do not wish to retire 21 and may be capable of match-
ing the performance of the average worker in younger groups.22
Regardless of coverage, however, this legislation must meet problems which
ordinary FEPC laws need not face. In barring distinctions based solely on
race or religion, society declares that such criteria bear no reasonable relation to
most job requirements.23 Discrimination because of age may, however, fre-
quently prove justified. Thus employers may understandably prefer younger
employees for jobs requiring a long period of training. Recognizing that such
programs may pay off only as long term investments, the Massachusetts
Commission has excused discrimination on this basis.24 A second possible
supra note 3, at 8. See also BARIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 194, where almost one fourth
of maxiaium age hiring rules for men specified ages below forty-five; and CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, op. cit. supra note 4 at 40, where almost one
half of the limits were below forty-five.
BAREIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 194, found that 71.4 per cent of maximum age hiring
rules specified women below forty-five. See also CALIFORNIA DEPARTm=T OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 37-40.
For proof that discrimination under forty-five was well known to the Massachusetts
Federation of Labor, which filed the Massachusetts bill, see Kelley, The Bay State
Pioneers, The American Federationist, Nov. 1950, p. 14, where the Secretary-Treasurer
of the MFL writes that the MFL "attracted statewide attention in the fight to have the
bill passed by citing countless advertisements in newspapers specifying only 20 or 30-
year-olds need apply...."
21. Surveys of Social Security beneficiaries indicated that only about five per cent re-
tired because they wished to do so. Furthermore, as of Jan. 1, 1950, about two fifths of all
eligible workers were not receiving old age insurance benefits under the Social Security
Act. Almost all of these had continued working or had returned to work after sixty-five.
BUREAU OF LARoR STATISTIcs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 7, 10.
Workers over sixty-five who wish to continue in their jobs face not only loss of old
age benefits but the obstacle of private retirement plans as well. Insurance group-annuity
contracts do not permit retirement ages over seventy. MACLEAN, LIFx INSURANCE 405
(1951). A common plan is for normal retirement at sixty-five and automatic retirement
at sixty-eight with service beyond that age at the absolute discretion of the employer.
See, e.g., abstracts of retirement plans of American Tobacco Company (compulsory re-
tirement at sixty-five), Chrysler Corporation, and Ford Motor Company (discretionary
retirement by the company for inefficiency after sixty-five). U.S. DEP'T LAboR, DIGEST
OF SELECTED HEALTH, INSURANCE, WELFARE, AND RETIREMENT PLANS UNDER COLLEcrIvE
BARGAINING 2, 10, 18 (1950).
For a typical statement against compulsory retirement see Industrial Labs, Science,
Jan. 3, 1947, p. 9.
22. Tests of mental and physical ability, while generally indicating the superiority
of younger age groups, show an overlap in the distribution of ability between the younger
and older groups. See, e.g., Edwards, Myth of Chronological Age, 34 J. APPLIED PSYall.
316 (1950) ; Sorenson, Mental Ability Over A Wide Range of Adult Ages, 17 Id. at 729
(1933). See also BARECIN, op. cit. smpra note 3, at 332.
23. See U.S. FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT 1 (1946).
24. Communication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL, supra note 11.
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objection to older workers is their higher illness and accident rates.25 In ad-
dition to reducing their efficiency, older workers' more frequent disability may
burden employers with slightly higher premiums under workmen's compen-
sation insurance plans and non-compulsory health, accident and hospitaliza-
tion insurance schemes.2 6 Furthermore, premiums under employer-financed
25. Kossoris, Absenteeism and Injury Experience of Older Workers, 67 MoNrruLy
LAn. Rnv. 16, 18 (1948), gives the following figures covering work injury rates in manu-
facturing industries in 1945.
Average days
Age group of disability













See also Barkin, op. cit. stpra note 3, at 327-9; and Kossoris, Relation of Age to Indus-
trial Injuries, 51 MONTuLy LAi. REv. 789 (1940).
As for non-occupational disability, tables in FAULRNmR, Accmm-r AND HnI,L IN-
supsEcn 158-61 (1940), show marked increases in the incidence of accidents and sick-
ness after age fifty. A survey of non-occupational disability in General Motors showed
that male workers over fifty had almost three times as many non-occupational sicknesses
as the younger group. Furthermore, the duration of each sickness was 50 per cent greater
in the older group. In the case of women, no such discrepancies existed chiefly because
younger women were frequently absent because of pregnancy. Gillen, The Cost of Em-
ployee Disability to the Employer, ImusTRl.%L HYGErNE FouiD.,TIoN TRANSACnoNS
BULLrr No. 15, THE HumA- SME oF INDUSTRY 59 (1950). For similar findings in
other industries see BAmixr, op. cit. supra note 3, at 329-31.
26. Experience rating is in general use in workmen's compensation insurance. While
there are a number of variant forms, the essence of the plan is to produce an adjusted
rate somewhere between the rate indicated by the firm's own accident experience and
the rate indicated by the job classification, i.e., the manual rate.
For large firms the retrospective rating plan is available. Under this plan, the insured
pays, within minimum and maximum limits, a premium based on his actual losses. Thus,
within the limits, the insured in effect becomes a self insurer and receives no protection
from insurance averages. HoaBs, VoRxms 's COmPENSATION INsUnANcE 554-83 (Zd ed.
1939).
State funds are either monopolistic or competitive with private insurance companies.
In either case, however, their rating practices are similar to private companies. Id. at
331-6.
As for the various types of non-compulsory group health insurance, the basic rates
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life insurance plans are based on mortality and thus increase with age.27
Although added non-wage benefit expenses are partially mitigated by income
tax deductions, 28 in some firms hiring older workers may well increase over-
all benefit costs, Moreover, firms with liberal benefit schemes will be hit
hardest.2 9 Neither the Massachusetts law nor the federal bill appear to sanc-
tion defenses based on these factors.
The most important justification of age discrimination is that in many cases
age may indicate genuine differences in ability to do a particular job. The
Massachusetts law requires the Commission to distinguish discrimination
based on "occupational qualifications" from "unfair" discrimination because
of age alone.80 But since the "occupational qualifications" phrase was in the
will usually vary with the makeup of the individual group. FAULKNER, op. cit. supra note
25, at 180-1.
Under some plans rates vary directly with age. See, e.g., PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
Co., PRUDENTIAL GROUP MAJOR-MEDICAL EXPENSE INSURANCE, brochure on file in Yale
Law Library, where rates for employees between fifty-five and fifty-nine are almost four
times higher than rates for employees under forty.
27. The cost of life insurance, ordinary, industrial or group, is dependent upon three
variables: (1) the rate of mortality, (2) the rate of expense incurred including taxes,
and (3) the rate of interest earned plus investment gain or loss. GREGG, AN ANALYSIS
OF GROUP LIFE INSURANCE 45-6, 136 (1950). Although workers tend to live longer thanl
the average non-worker of the same age, the group mortality rate at fifty is over four
times as high as at thirty. Id. at 49. See also MIcLEAN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 396.
Group premiums are calculated by multiplying the rates for each age group by the
number of members in each group. A fifty year old employee will be about twice as ex-
pensive to insure as a thirty year old. The final cost is usually based in part on the
experience with the particular risk. Id. at 397.
Between 15 and 20 million workers employed by almost 50,000 firms are insured
under group life insurance plans. GREGG, op. cit. supra note 27, at 141, 143; ME=I &
OsLER, MODERN LIFE INSURANCE 208 (1949).
28. Insurance premiums generally and out-of-pocket payments for employee injuries
and pensions constitute deductible business expenses under INT. REV. CODE § 23 (a) (1) (A).
Contributions by an employer to an employees' trust or annuity plan are deductible under
INT. REV. CODE §23(p). But unprosperous firms will receive less benefit from the de-
ductions since taxes are based only on net income.
29. For an indication that the costs of non-wage benefits are a factor in the setting
of age limits, see CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Op. Cit. supra note
4, at 42-7. Firms having some form of employee benefits had twice as high an incidence
of maximum hiring age limits as firms which granted no benefits.
The motivation for setting age limits may be increased by the steadily rising cost of non-
wage benefits generally. Compare the figures in U.S CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC
RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, WAGE SUPPLEMENTs-THE NONWAGE LABOR COSTS or DOING
BUSINESS 6-7, 13 (1950) with those in U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC RESEARCu
DEPARTMENT, THE HIDDEN PAYROLL-NON-WAGE LABOR COSTS or DOING BUSINESS
(1949).
30. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 151B. §4 (1950).
Whether the federal bill contains a similar requirement is uncertain. Although the
bill in its declaration of policy decries only discrimination against "properly qualified"
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FEPC law before the age amendment, the statute gives the Commission little
guidance for its difficult task. Nor has the Commission itself set any specific
criteria.31 Indeed, formulation of useful standards for determining whether a
worker's age is relevant to his qualifications for a particular job may at
present be impossible. Abstract tests show that mental ability, after reaching
a peak at ages twenty to twenty-nine, declines gradually until the late forties
or early fifties, and then sinks more sharply, 32 while hand and eye tests demon-
strate a decline in physical ability somewhere between thirty and forty.33
workers, H.R. 4731, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. §2(a) (1951), the statute itself proscribes age
discrimination against "any individual" without using the modifying words of the pre-
face. Id. § 5.
31. Under the Commission's policies a bona fide job qualification may be determined
either by the Commission upon request of an employer, who must furnish the Commission
with such information as it may request, or by the employer himself. In the latter case,
when a complaint is made the burden is on the employer to prove the "validity" of the
qualification. MASSACHUSErrs CommissioN AGAINST DisCRxMuNATz0xo POLICIES § IOC
(mimeo. Feb. 1951).
32. Sorsenson, supra note 22 at 729. See THORNDIKE, ADULT LEAmaNxx 131 (1928),
where the author finds that "at about fifty-five the net result of changes in general
energy, interest in one's work, and ability to improve is a regression in achievement."
See also Lawton, Mental Abilities At Senescence: .4 Sur'ey Of Prsct-Day Research,
22 J. A PimD PsycH. 607 (1938).
Vocabulary is the one exception to mental decline in senescence. Sorenson, supra, note
22. Tests of memory show a 17 per cent decline from peak efficiency during the years
fifty to sixty-nine; tests of judgment show a 13 per cent decline. Miles, Age and Human
Ability, 40 PsYcH. REv. 99, 114, 116 (1933). See also Ruch, The Differentiathe Effects
Of Age Upon Human Leanzing, 11 J. GEN. PsYcH. 261 (1934).
Much work has been done from a historical angle to determine at what ages great
men do their best work. See, e.g.. Lehman, Man's Most Crcatize Years, 59 Scl. MoNm.Y
384 (1944), where superior contributions in geology, psychology, opera composition,
short story writing, poetry, education, economics, political science, mathematics, inven-
tions, hymn composition, and chemistry were all found to have been made most often at
about thirty-five years of age. Similar results were obtained in the analyses of contri-
butions in physics, botany, pathology, classical descriptions of disease, medicine, public
hygiene, philosophy, and literature. Lehman, Man's Most Creative Years: Then and
Now, 98 Sci. 393 (1943). But see Bjorksten, Conments and CriticimIs, 62 Scx. MONTHLY
94 (1946), who argues that these findings could merely be the result of the press of in-
creased administrative duties that come with age and success.
Age also affects personality. See generally Jones, Personality and Age, 136 N\LURE
779 (1935). There is evidence that older people are more conservative. See Pollak, Con-
servatism in Later Maturity and Old Age, 8 Am. Soc. Rn'. 175 (1943). People in older
age groups have been found to be more serious minded and self restrained. Vomen seem
to tend towards unpleasant moods and feelings in old age. Guilford & Martin, Age Dif-
ferences and Sex Differences in Some Introucrize and Emotional Traits, 31 J. GEn.
PsYcH. 219 (1944). Older people generally tend to be more variable in their traits. Preston,
Trait Variability as a Function of Practice and of Age, 37 J. Gra. PSYCH. 3 (1947).
33. Reach and grasp tests show a 12 per cent decline from peak efficiency in the fifty
to sixty-nine age group. Rotary motility has been found to decline 11 per cent. When
reaction was tested by an experiment requiring a downward press of the finger, the usual
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Tests simulating industrial work show a similar and sometimes more extreme
decrease in physical ability with age. 84 But evidence as to the comparative
productivity of older and younger workers in actual job situations is almost
entirely lacking.3 5 And the significance of the little data available is unclear 8 0
age curve appeared. But other reaction tests showed no appreciable drop in the fifty
to sixty-nine age group. In all these tests the age group above sixty-nine was about 30
per cent below peak efficiency. Miles, Measures of Certain Human Abilities Throughout
the Life Span, 17 PRoc. NAT. ACAD. Sci. 627 (1931). See also Miles, Age and Human
Ability, 40 PsycH. Ray. 99, 113 (1933), and Miles, Correlation of Reaction and Co-
ordination Speed with Age in Adults, 43 AM. J. PsycH. 377 (1931). In tests of finger
tremor, a sixty to eighty-five year old group showed a 19 per cent increase over a group
sixteen to thirty-five years old. Edwards, supra note 22, at 316.
The efficiency of all measurable functions of the eye decreases with advancing age.
See generally Friedenwald, The Eye in PROBLEaS OF AGEING 535 (Cowdry ed., 2d ed.
1942). Visual acuity has been found to decrease as much as 30 per cent between fifty
and sixty years of age. Id. at 537. Visual sensitivity as revealed by the light threshold
also shows a decline. Birren, Bick, & Yiengst, The Relation of Structural Changes of
the Eye and Vitamin A to Elevation of the Light Threshold in Later Life, 40 J. Ex-
PERIMENTAL PSYCH. 260 (1950). Adaptation to the dark declines progressively until forty
and then drops more sharply. Steven, Dark Adaptation and Age, 157 NATuRz 376 (1946).
Ability to discriminate colors by hue, saturation and lightness shows a marked decline
after fifty. Smith, Age Differences in Color Discrimination, 29 J. GEN. Psycix. 191. 204
(1943). Tests of color blindness show an abnormally high rate after sixty. Boice, Tinker,
& Paterson, Color Vision and Age, 61 Am. J. PSYCH. 520 (1948). Glare vision shows
a heavy drop after age thirty. DeSilva, Age and Highway Accidents, 47 Scl. MONTHLY
536 (1938).
Tests of the fusion frequency of flicker, i.e., the number of rapid flashes of light that
can be seen separately rather than as a steady illumination, show a drop in the average
and maximum rates, while the minimum rates for all age groups stay relatively the same.
Simonson, Enzer & Blankstein, The Influence of Age on the Fusion Frequency of Flicker,
29 J. EXPERIMENTAL PsycH. 252 (1941). See also Misiak, Age and Sex Differences in
Critical Flicker Frequency, 37 Id. at 318 (1947).
34. Smith, Age and Performance on a Repetitive Manual Task, 22 J. APPLIED PSYCH.
295 (1938). In this very thorough experiment, tests consisting of the assembling and dis-
assembling of bolts and nuts were made of four age groups. In addition to a short test
period, measurements were taken over a four hour span, and financial incentives were
provided so as to simulate actual working conditions. During the four hour period fifty
year olds were on the average 13.5 per cent inferior to thirty year olds, in contrast to an
8.1 per cent inferiority in the shorter period. However, 15 per cent of the fifty year olds
were equal or superior to the median thirty year old man. The work curve at fifty years
showed no tendency toward relative slowness in warming up at the beginning and no
relative drop at the end of the work period. See also Ehinger, Declin des Aptitudes ave€
L'Age, ARcHrvEs DE PsYCioLoGiE, 23, 67, 73 (1931-32). Tests of bead stringing, paper
cutting and disc placing showed a fifty year old group to be 6.7 per cent to 19.4 per cent
inferior to a thirty year old group.
35. See BuREAu OF LABOR STAmzsrxcs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 16.
36. See Cover & Pressy, Age and Route Sales Efficiency, 34 J. APPLIED PsYcH. 229
(1950). Here performances of house to house salesmen of foodstuffs were evaluated,
Older men as a group, while more careful operators of the company vehicles, fell off
markedly in the amount of sales. See also studies of hourly earnings hi BAnKiN, op. cit.
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While information gleaned from tests is suggestive, it is an insufficient guide
for setting standards. 37 This uncertainty saps the Massachusetts law's effec-
tiveness. Lacking both statutory and scientific tests of whether discrimination
is justified, the Commission has, thus far, usually assented to the claim that
the applicant lacked the requisite ability.38
Even if more accurate information as to older workers' abilities were ob-
tained, FEPC legislation could probably do little to solve the age discrimina-
tion problem. Where older workers were proved fully qualified for certain
jobs, FEPC would no doubt be effective. But indications are that for most
jobs older workers would be found less efficient; in these circumstances the
law permits discrimination. Thus an adequate solution to the age problem
must be sought elsewhere. If present high-employment economic conditions
continue, the efforts of welfare organizations and collective bargaining, if
augmented, may be adequate to ensure the hiring of older people. But in an
economic recession, 39 if the government's overriding objective is employment
of older workers, it might be necessary to pass laws requiring employers to
hire specified percentages of older workers-as is now done under some labor-
management contracts. Forcing older workers on employers, however, might
leave abler younger workers unemployed, thus lowering the productive ca-
pacity of the nation. A better solution might be to provide a program of
public works for the needy aged. Before any new approach is tried, however,
the government should make an exhaustive study of the role of the older
supra note 3 at 332 et seq., which shows peak productivity to be reached in the thirty-five
to thirty-nine age period. However in Palmer & Brownell, Influence of Age on Em-
ployment Opportunities, 48 'MONTHLY LnB. REV. 765 (1939), the authors conclude that
there is no clear relation between age and output for those workers who can maintain
minimum production standards.
37. See Clague, The Job Outlook for Older Workcrs, The American Federationist,
Nov. 1950, pp. 29, 30, where the United States Commissioner of Labor Statistics advocates
a systematic study of the on-the-job abilities of older workers to fill "a great dearth of
factual information on a number of key points."
38. Up to Jan. 10, 1952, the Commission had disposed of thirteen cases. The Com-
mission found lack of probable cause in 7 cases, a lack of jurisdiction in 2, and 4 cases
were settled "after investigation and conference." Ninety-four requests "have given rea-
sons to warrant an exemption based on a bona fide job qualification." Communication to
the YAI.H LAW JOURNAL from Mildred H. Mahoney, Chairman of the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination, dated Jan. 10, 1952 on file in Yale Law Library.
39. "A continuing special problem of employment for older workers tends to persist
through good times and bad. However, both the magnitude and nature of this problem
are greatly affected by changes in the general employment situation.
"In the early postwar years of high levels of employment, unemployment among
older workers approached minimum levels." Clague, supra note 37, at 29.
For a good statistical presentation of the problem of the older worker in a period of
depression, see Com.IssioNE OF LABOR AND STATISTICS OF MAR yAND, THE OTLr
kVoaxR rx MARYLAND (1930).
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worker in our prospective economy.40 Meanwhile, without supplementary
measures, FEPC promises relief for only a tiny proportion of older people
and nothing but false hopes for the rest.
41
40. See Clague, supra -note 37, at 30.
41. It was fundamentally for this reason that the New York State Joint Legislative
Committee on Problems of the Aging rejected an anti-discrimination law as a solution,
See Findings and Recominendations, supra note 11, at 29.
